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Fascist Nihilism and Its Meaning for Christians

OLIVER MARTIN

One of the most serious errors Christians can commit is to think that the present war is essentially analogous to the first World War; that the present struggle is merely imperialistic, a grab for booty by rival bad men. This error leads to the implication that it is a mark of Christian wisdom to have little or nothing to do with such an evil affair. And this is accompanied by one or the other of (what the writer believes to be) two false beliefs: (1) that without the fighting aid of the United Nations the oppressed peoples of Europe will finally revolt and throw off their enslavers ("for men will not for long tolerate slavery; it is contrary to the human spirit"); and (2) that even if the Axis powers are allowed to conquer, the "good" people in each nation will finally get control and create a better society. Cessation of hostilities now would make the latter possible, and on the whole there would be less suffering and misery. Perhaps a negotiated peace would be an act of Christian forgiveness that would lessen the probability of further fascist expansion.

What is overlooked and sometimes misunderstood is the nihilistic character of fascism.¹ Nihilism is hatred of existence as such. More specifically, it is hatred of all that defines humans as humans. The human being may be said to be an integration of at least three levels of being: the physical, the biological, and the mental or spiritual. Qualitative distinctions define these three levels. If this is denied, then one would have to say, for example, that the difference between

¹The term "fascism" will be used here in a generic sense.

The term "nihilism" was applied by Turgenev to an anarchistic movement of minor importance in Russia during the nineteenth century. Influenced by positivism this pseudo-scientific movement intended to abolish the family and all religion. While having some characteristics similar to present fascist nihilism, considered in a total historical perspective the movement was really part of the people's struggle for enlightenment, however wrong it may have been.

human beings and other forms of life is merely quantitative, a difference only in complexity; the categories of biology represent something real, the categories of the mental or spiritual at best are only fictions. It is this denial that is implicit in nihilism. But that is only its formal expression. Concretely, nihilism is a union of power and form. The power is hate. And it is this union of power and form that characterizes fascism. How and why is this so?

There are at least two characteristics—and here we are speaking empirically, not metaphysically—which distinguish the human being from other forms of life: (1) reflective self-consciousness, and (2) moral consciousness. These modes of experience and activity are often more potential than actual. Particular human creatures are more or less, or now and then, self-conscious and morally conscious. However, it is such potentiality or capabilities which are in part the defining characteristics of humans *as* humans. Self-consciousness refers to the ability to become conscious of one's own self, to see oneself objectively. It implies self-transcendence and the normative use of reason. Men can (even though they may not) reason about values and discover truth about them. Therefore, there is at least the possibility that conflicts in values can be partially solved by the means of rational persuasion. Moral consciousness implies the ability to have moral experience, to recognize the distinction between the "is" and the "ought." Such recognition gives rise to that "tension" which defines what is called a "conscience." Now any program of action which (1) denies the reality of these distinctions that characterize humans as humans, (2) which is based upon hatred of the humanity of man, and (3) which takes means to eradicate from existence all activity which these characteristics imply—that program of action is nihilistic. All fascist movements satisfy this meaning of nihilism.

Even the denial of the rational nature of man is part of the history of human thought. So it is that in such history we find nihilistic tendencies from ancient times to the present. From the standpoint of knowledge perhaps the most radical position was that of the sophist Gorgias who was fond of pointing out: (1) that nothing exists; (2) if anything does exist, it cannot be known; and (3) if it can be known, such knowledge cannot be communicated. The importance of such nihilism becomes quite unacademic when carried over to the field of values. Ethical nihilism is a denial that values

exist in any objective sense whatsoever. And, of course, it follows that there is nothing about values which can be known or communicated. Nevertheless, just as when all "truth" is denied the very concept must be used, so those who deny the existence of values must use the notion of value. Value is reduced to a product of the capricious will of individuals or groups.

Fascism is nihilistic because its essence is a hatred for that goodness which dignifies the human being *as human*. Such a hatred implies the necessity of destroying that level of being which is in part responsible for, and which can recognize, such goodness. Hence, the necessity of eradicating the humanity of man wherever found. This means the crucifixion of man's intellect and moral consciousness. Socrates said, "Know Thyself." Self-knowledge is incompatible with man viewed merely as a beast of prey. Hence, away with it. Mature moral consciousness is incompatible with the dogma that the Führer's will defines the true and the right. Hence, down with it. In education nothing is so hated by the fascists as the philosophic quest.

A most dangerous belief is that fascism is something confined within certain geographical boundaries. This allows the self-righteous to believe that fascism is "over there," not "here." However, fascism arises from nihilistic tendencies. The latter is causally basic. And nihilism is as universal as the power of hatred. In all individuals and groups such a tendency may be discerned. The danger exists when it is relatively dominant in individuals and becomes organized in groups. Nihilism is to be found in cultural trends in what we call the democratic nations; which partly accounts for the balance of power being so tenuous within those nations. Many good and respectable people would undoubtedly be shocked to know that many of their practical philosophical beliefs constitute the philosophical bases of fascism, and lead to fascism to the extent to which they act on those beliefs.

To illustrate: If one says that matters political and religious are not amenable to rational discussion, he is asserting the nihilistic position which in part defines fascism. Almost all values come directly under broad interpretations of the political and religious, and to deny that men are capable of reasoning about them is equivalent to saying that such values are in no sense objective, and hence no knowledge of them that is communicable is possible. Common remarks when dealing with problems of value, such as "it's all a matter of opinion,"

or "everything is relative," are not confined merely to sophisticated sophomores. A good fraction of the people, at least part of the time, believe and act on such half-truths. These propositions are even used by "scholars" as a basis of "objective" research in the social sciences, although it is safe to say that hardly anyone would be prepared to make a rational defense of such statements. If all truths concerning values are merely relative to the subjectivity of individuals or groups, then indeed there can be no knowledge of values; and if there could be knowledge, it could not be communicated to disputants with the aim of solving conflicts through rational persuasion. The court of final appeal can only be violence or coercion when compromise proves impractical. This is exactly the thesis of fascists, and they truly accuse of hypocrisy certain secular liberals who like to identify themselves with the best in democracy, while at the same time acting on and uttering false principles as though they were somehow new and modern, forgetting (or more often, being ignorant of the fact) that their best refutation is as old as Plato.

From the standpoint of the theory of knowledge nihilism implies solipsism. The world is my idea, and *merely* mine. If one merely insists on believing this, and one's action remains rather local, little harm can be done. The most the believer can suffer is to be visited by men in white and be condemned to strut the grounds of a state institution. The fascist dictator is at once more realistic and dangerous. Within the nation he can tolerate no other will of equal power. But since in fact the wills of many are not his, he must make them his by "education," or neutralize them by the process of extermination. The logic is that if solipsism is not in fact true, such truth must be created. Extreme subjectivism here has a pragmatic twist. Hence the need for large scale action; mere belief is not enough. Fascist "activism" follows necessarily from the attempt to "make true" what cannot be true. Coercion and violence against persons within the nation is not a process that is self-liquidating. There is no dialectic here of force against force. Rather violence augments violence. The more violence is used, the more of it is necessary. The function of violence creates the conditions that demand its increase.

Now this spiral cannot go on forever, and this fact gives rise to optimism on the part of the enemies of fascism, believing as they do that the margin of decreasing returns must set in. The idea is that

fascism will destroy itself necessarily by weight of its own internal contradictions. External force is not required. In the course of time the "people" will arise and throw off their oppressors. Especially is great hope put in the possibility of internal revolution in fascist countries by those in the democracies who, unconscious rationalization though it be, by that very belief absolve themselves from responsibility for aiding in the destruction of fascism by external force. The probability of revolution, thus rendering unnecessary external violence, was a favorite argument of some anti-fascists prior to the entry of the United States into the war.

But such optimism is false for several reasons. Some of the conditions that are a prerequisite for a successful social revolution according to Lenin are not to be found in fascist countries. More than a will to revolt is required. The means to revolt, the acquisition of arms and an effective organization, is lacking. Under a democratic capitalism these means may not be found wanting, and the dialectical process can take its course. Internal contradictions lead to the revolution. But one aim of fascism is just to eliminate the conditions required for a successful social revolution.

To such an argument the critic always has an apparently excellent reply. What is overlooked, it will be said, is that all fascism can do is simply to forestall for a time the inevitable revolution. Fascism does not, nor cannot, eliminate the causes of revolution; it only postpones the effects. Actually it aggravates the causes of revolt and ultimately makes it all the more certain. Now the logic here is perfect provided that a suppressed premise were true in fact. But the conclusion is only true if the interpretation of "causes" is somewhat narrowed. If persons *as persons* could remain in a fascist "order," then the demands of personality would ultimately assert themselves. For one of the "causes" of revolt always is to be found in human nature, in that aspect of human nature which defines a person as human, namely, the potentiality of reason and of moral consciousness. Beasts may be recalcitrant, but they do not revolt. Those who assert the inevitability of revolt against fascism always presuppose that such a cause will remain in existence. The cause always made explicit is the social one. Fascism can only augment the rottenness of society so far as its formal and institutional structure is concerned. The suffering and oppression of the people can only increase. Now this is true. However, people who over a period

of time have had all their "humanity" crushed out of them may no longer act as persons. If they are reduced to beasts they will no longer want to revolt. If those potentialities which define a person as human are not allowed to develop at all, then however much an entity may be potentially human, he is actually something much less than that—and acts accordingly. Mere potentiality alone cannot assert itself. It is in this way that fascism eliminates one of the causes of revolt. Many of the social causes of revolution it can never eliminate. *But just because it cannot do so it must destroy the mind of man, his moral and social consciousness, the distinction between good and evil.* Men can be exploited and oppressed and be made to like it just to the extent that they cease to be men. Fascists recognize this truth; and also another one, that to the degree that human potentialities are developed and become actual men cannot be oppressed and at the same time be made to like it. These were the truths that, in more indirect language, Hitler laid before the big business men in his speech at Düsseldorf, in January of 1932. The needs of private monopoly capitalism and the values of democracy at its best are ultimately incompatible. A choice must be made. Hitler extended his invitation. The internal contradictions of democratic capitalism, of which Marx spoke, Hitler also recognized (in the way in which he could!).

The Nazi program is an answer to those contradictions; it is not a program in which those contradictions are merely aggravated and sustained. The aggravation is temporary, lasting through the transition phase. The new nazi "man" will not be human enough to revolt. The error of those who believe that the internal contradictions of fascism will burst it asunder is that they have not fully grasped the nihilistic character of fascism. Fascism is thought to be merely the last stage, the death agonies, of a decaying democratic capitalistic order. Even if one grants that it is at least that, it is wrong to suppose that it is merely that. Fascism is not just the democratic capitalistic order *quantitatively* changed, i.e., the internal contradictions merely intensified. There is a qualitative change, and the characteristics are those of nihilism with all its implications. To be consistent fascism must reduce the human being to the biological level. It is no accident that Hitler's ultimate categories of "blood" and "race" are biological categories. One might plausibly maintain that the alternative of fascism did not have to be taken in

any country. But once fascists are in power the logic of their actions is inexorable. The consistency of fascists, as with all of us, may only be relative, but such relativity will not guarantee their downfall. The irrational does not become rational, because it has a logic all its own.

There is no reason to believe that people sufficiently indoctrinated over a period of years will not willingly consent to nazi rule. When a well-educated American of good-will says that fascist violence must ultimately prove self-defeating, that the active consent of any peoples can never be obtained by force, there is an unconscious identification of the "people" with himself. If he puts it this way, he is probably correct: "I have had the advantage of knowing another way of life. In my own mind I could never willingly assent to a fascist order. And many others feel as I do." While what he says is true, it is not quite relevant to the issue. Fascists would agree with him. The trouble is that he will not live forever. Moreover, fascism may shorten his natural life span. He may be killed or put into a concentration camp. Let us grant that his will, and that of his generation, will never be broken. However, the aim of fascism is not to convert anti-fascists through the use of violence. One of its aims is to render powerless and inefficacious in every possible way the influence of those who know the way of life fascism is seeking to destroy. At the same time, through complete control of the "educational" process, generations of youth will be so moulded into sub-human forms that they will consent to the fascist order. They won't know enough to revolt. There would be nothing to revolt "to" or "from." Social revolution is a dynamic sort of thing, presupposing leaders who have at least a minimum in freedom of action, and what is most important, *a continuity between present and past*. The aim of fascism is to break that continuity. A social revolution, too, may to some extent sever the past from the present. However, the point is that a social revolution is not possible if such continuity has already been broken.

Who will say that fascism, if not stopped, cannot carry out its aims? In the short span of a decade the nazis have been successful. Witness the difference between the older German and the young man who has known only the nazi order. If fascist nations ultimately triumph, who will revolt? And against what? In Germany power will be completely in the hands of those who have

known only nazism. And if they dominate the world, will not the thesis of the Führer have been verified? The power of illusion here is tremendous. Those rotting away in concentration camps will understand it. But when in a more normal order of things so many can be fooled, is there any reason to believe that the light of truth will penetrate the "blood" of the new barbarians?

It will now be understood why fascism is something that cannot be localized. The very existence, let alone the prospering, of a real democratic society would tend to cast doubt upon the truth of the dictator's statements. The logic of fascism is that, since democracies *are* rotten, dead, or dying, if they do not rot and die they must be destroyed. The use of violence is necessary to prove their contentions. As a matter of fact, fascism can only compete with a democratic order on the plane of violence. There can be no peaceful intercourse between two such orders, for there is no common ground. And some unity is necessary for any diversity that is not chaos. On what could two such social orders agree in order that on other matters there could be peaceful and intelligent disagreement? How can there be an appeal to compromise and rational persuasion in dealing with fascism when its thesis is that an appeal to such methods rather than violence is a sign of softness, of decay? The fascists recognize that there can be no compromise. The democracies have almost too late come to such awareness. Pathetically wrong were those high officials in the democracies who were willing to tolerate fascism and nazism so long as they were confined within Italy and Germany.

Furthermore, fascism cannot forever live disrespected by others. There are only two ways of gaining the semblance of respect. The one way is to earn it. The other way is to force it—as a Japanese does when he delights in making an English prisoner bow to him. The fact that violence really cannot create respect is beside the point. All that is required is the form. Fascists are not interested in ethical subtleties, and to assume that there is any worthy mental attitude not constituted ultimately by fear and violence is to assume something they know nothing about—and hence could not demand. The semblance of respect only is necessary; and it is also sufficient.

If fascism cannot be localized it must conquer the world. Let it be so, some will say. Perhaps that will be the best, quickest, and easiest way of defeating fascism. For since it has been said that

fascism must destroy everything other than itself by violence, once it has done so, by its own logic it has nothing else to do; and therefore it must turn itself into something else. Out of the ruins of a fascist world will come a better world. But this is a perversion of the dialectic with vengeance. It expresses nothing more than the impious belief that somehow or other, if evil is allowed to run its course unopposed, everything will come out all right in the end. Metaphysically this is highly questionable; and as a guide for action it is worthless.

A distinction must be made between mental and physical violence. The law of fascist nihilism is this: To the degree that mental violence is increased and sustained, just to that extent physical violence becomes unnecessary. Why is this so? It is during the counter-revolutionary phase that the greatest amount of physical violence is required. This phase marks the gradual destruction of all minds and institutions incompatible with, and opposed to, fascism. To the extent that such destruction has been accomplished the proportion of physical violence will decrease. However, for the preservation of fascism mental violence (the destruction of the mind of man) will have to be kept at a maximum. Physical violence will be necessary just so long as there are non-fascist minds to be destroyed. A generation or two may be sufficient time to separate individuals from the past. The time element is somewhat hypothetical. If the Axis powers finally triumph, war undoubtedly will continue until fascist nations are all subordinated to some one group. The universe has no room for two absolutes. Germany and Japan cannot both deify themselves and act accordingly without war. Supposing for the moment that ultimate power finally should lie with German nazis, after a few generations of mental and physical violence individuals of human form would have only nazi "minds." The function of whatever physical violence remained would not be that of destroying minds—for there would be none left to destroy—but rather that of aiding in the "ordering" of beasts in human form. Individuals will still be born potentially human as they are now. The function of fascism is to retard growth, to prevent what is potential from becoming actual. However, the means used is the perversion of the educative process; mental, not physical, violence primarily. Peace will reign, but it will be the peace of death.

Granting the relative truth of all this, have we not made it too absolute? After all, even fascists are humans, and is there any guarantee that they will always follow out the logic of nihilism? Are we not imputing to fascists a consistency only to be found in formal logic, and a power of destructiveness which, however great, cannot be so absolute as to attain their desires? The flame of humanity may be put out, but sparks will remain.

This is true. A contrary belief would be compatible only with atheism. But the objection is hardly relevant. As Whitehead has put it, the moral fact of the universe is the instability of evil. If there were no power in the universe that could in the long run triumph over the power of nihilism, then the atheism of fascism would be true. Christians are bound to believe in the final victory of love over hate. But how long is the "long run"? That is the question. Given the truth of the Christian faith, it can hardly be a criterion of judgment for practical action in particular cases. Certainly a victory for world fascism will not prove false what we believe to be the truth of the Christian faith; nor would a victory of the United Nations alone verify it. How long the "long run" is depends in part on what kind of choices we make in "short runs." What comfort or consolation is there in the knowledge that in the distant future the flame of humanity will once more be rekindled, if we also know that by our inaction and irresponsibility we helped to quench that flame for centuries to come? Even Hitler has not wished nazism to be eternal. His limit is one thousand years. Is it a mark of a Christian conscience to acquiesce and allow him the next thousand years in the hope that the second thousand may belong to God? "By their fruits ye shall know them."

Due to the nihilistic character of fascism it cannot be overthrown merely from within. The present war is different from the last one in many ways. The home front in Germany is better protected this time, and the secret of success may in part be discovered in the nature of nihilism. The power necessary to defeat fascism lies beyond fascist nations. Knowledge of this fact puts a greater responsibility than ever upon us of the democracies. And understanding it explains why the hope that the oppressed peoples in nazi-dominated countries might do the job for us is a futile hope—and a dangerous one.

It would seem then, that by the very logic of their belief Christians

of whatever color or stripe dare not shirk their responsibility in the struggle against fascism—whether it be “here” or “there.” Nihilism is absolutely incompatible with Christianity, whatever its form. And for several reasons. Jesus came that men might have life. He came not to destroy it. It is in this most important respect that Christianity differs from certain elements of Oriental religions. But men can have fullness of life *only in so far as they are men and not something less*. Again, love is creative; hate is destructive. God is creative and loving, as revealed in the life and teachings of Jesus. And creativity, whatever else it may mean, implies that those potentialities of reason and moral consciousness—which define us as humans, must be allowed to develop and become actual; such fruition being in part the result of the power of love.

It is undoubtedly true that no social order, historical or theoretical, can unqualifiedly be called Christian. But that does not mean, as unfortunately some Christians seem to think, that therefore it is a matter of indifference to Christianity what social order or philosophy exists; or that since all societies must be imperfect, one is not much better or worse than another. It is not Christian tolerance to tolerate any movement that hates and would destroy everything for which Christianity stands. And it is not Christian wisdom at its best to believe that the evil of organized nihilism is not quite real, but apparent only, and that somehow or other, without too much effort or suffering, we may get rid of it merely by talking, preaching, or hiding our heads in the sands of either shore which separates us from most of human suffering.

The Philosophy of Francisco Romero of Argentina

JOHN H. HERSHEY

Francisco Romero's philosophy of transcendence is of interest both from the point of view of its conception of reality and its interpretation of history. Professor Romero is teacher of philosophy in the Universities of Buenos Aires and of La Plata. He is also secretary of the Alejandro Korn chair of philosophy in the Free College of Superior Studies in Buenos Aires. This chair was created in honor of Argentina's greatest philosopher, Alejandro Korn, who died in 1936 at the age of seventy-six, and who was teacher and friend of Romero. A leading philosopher in Argentina today, however, is Romero himself, and he expounds a philosophy of transcendence. This philosophy is interpreted in its general outlines in the account that follows, which is based upon a pamphlet, *Filosofia de la Persona* (Philosophy of the Person), 1938, and a lengthy article published in the Argentine literary journal, *Sur*, October, 1940, and entitled, *Programa de una Filosofia* (Program of a Philosophy).

The meaning of the structural view of reality in contrast to the atomistic conception is important in Romero's philosophy. In the atomistic view, reality is conceived as merely an aggregation of parts. Only the units composing the whole are real, and the whole is a collection. But in the idea of structure, reality is more than the sum of its parts; the whole is real and imparts peculiarity and novelty to each part. It is, however, acknowledged, he says, that the individual unit by virtue of its inherent powers, may also contribute novelty to the whole. But what is important is the conception of the structural rather than the atomistic whole in Romero's philosophy of transcendence, the basic motifs of which we shall now set forth.

Ideas of evolution are also analyzed by the Argentine philosopher. Hegel of Germany and Spencer of England gave the concept of evolution universality, extending its meaning to all reality. Hegel, however, interpreted it idealistically, while Spencer considered it rather mechanically. A fresh view was formulated by Bergson in his theory of creative evolution. Romero himself, as can be inferred from what has been said regarding structure, rejects the mechanical

interpretation of evolution, and furthermore thinks the idea of strict continuity is a "philosophic prejudice" derived from accepting the atomistic world view. But he accepts the evolution idea viewed from his transcendental approach.

With regard to his interpretation of being, the Argentine professor holds to the conception of different, though related, realms of being which form a scale or hierarchy. There are at least four such planes. First is the physical level of existence. Secondly, there is the vital which includes but is more than the physical. Thirdly, there is the psychical plane which is higher than the two previous ones. Fourthly and last, is the realm of the person and absolute values. This level of reality is the spiritual and is distinct from that of the merely psychical. The psychical, as such, is mind; but the spirit is more than just the mental because it has to do with values. Romero says he accepts the teaching of Max Scheler as to the three characteristics of spirit, namely, liberty, self-consciousness and objectivity. The most essential characteristic, according to Romero, is the last, that is, objectivity. With reference to knowledge, objectivity means that man as a person is not content with knowing the world in its relation to his practical interests, but strives also to know things as they are in their ultimate nature. With regard to action, objectivity means that the spiritual individual seeks to realize values like justice, even when they are contrary to his natural impulses. It is the sense of duty that relates the person to the highest values by obliging him to decide for them against mere self-interest. "In a vast panorama, visible only to the illuminated eyes of the spirit, are as supreme categories of values, the noble, the beautiful, the just." Thus in Romero's philosophy the four planes of being, physical, vital, psychical and spiritual, form a hierarchy or scale, the physical being the lowest and the spiritual the highest.

The question may arise as to what is the relation between these four levels, besides that of lower and higher. One relation is that of support. The physical supports the living; the living, the psychical; and the psychical, the spiritual. This fact gives to some, according to Romero, the false understanding that absolute determinism and causation are involved in proceeding from lower to higher. Another kind of relation obtaining between the four planes is that of stability and solidity, for each lower plane has greater stability and solidity than that which is higher. The physical, for example,

is more solid than the living, and so on. Romero says this fact also gives the mistaken interpretation that the higher levels are mere accidents or epiphenomena. But he maintains that stability and solidity are not adequate tests of the validity of being.

Thus in contrast to atomistic, mechanical and materialistic views of reality, Romero does not reduce the higher levels to the lowest level of the physical as though only this level were real while the others are not. Such an interpretation he calls "total immanence" because everything is "explained" by the lowest, the purely physical. But there is also the idea of "partial immanence" which he does not accept, by which one of the higher levels, such as life, is made the highest instead of the level of spirit. This is "biologism." The third level of the psychical and the highest level of the spiritual, are in this view wholly explained by the vital impetus. But according to Romero, each plane possesses reality in its own right and should not be reduced wholly to lower levels.

The transcendental philosophy holds that there is a transcendent impetus in all reality, in all the levels of being, even the lowest, by which each level is enabled to rise to a higher one, to transcend itself. The highest possible realm is that of spirituality, absolute values, essences. The spirit transcends the psychical; the psychical, the living; the living, the physical. Transcendence is least visible in the physical, and is completely manifest in the spiritual. In picturesque language he says:

"The transcendent impetus circulates within each plane, agitating it like a tide and at times like a storm, trying all possibilities within its environs. . . . Soon it finds a breach, an opening for escape, and without abandoning its task in the conquered territory, ascends to another plane where it can move with greater freedom."

The ultimate process of transcending is reached in the plane of spirit, essence, value.

Although it is difficult in a brief space to interpret Romero's idea of the relation between the philosophy of transcendence and human history, the following may be suggestive. In the Middle Ages, theological transcendence was incorporated in institutions and the common life. God was the supreme end around which all was to be oriented. But with the coming of the Modern Age, the part is often thought to be the highest reality in philosophy, and the individual the highest in society. Philosophies of the universe were

often atomistic; the Protestant Reformation prepared the way for the view that the individual is the source of authority; the doctrine of natural rights was later also based on an individualistic conception. But at the present time, efforts are being made to transcend the part in philosophic thinking and the individual in society. Thus doctrines of a class, a race, a state as supreme are promulgated. But Romero is emphatic in saying this is merely putting collective egoism in place of individual egoism. A class, a race, a state do indeed have their place as a part within the whole, as a stage in the process. But it is a mistake to make any one of them the whole, the highest. It is a false transcendence. A genuine transcendental philosophy is therefore needed to replace both the atomistic explanations of the universe and the purely individualistic and class conceptions of man. It is not, however, the same kind of transcendence as that of the Middle Ages which had a personal deity as supreme. The philosophy of transcendence, according to Professor Francisco Romero, means that the absolute spiritual values constitute the highest realities and loyalties.

As the moon moves our ocean waters from a distance, likewise, Romero writes, the attraction of value produces the tide of transcending in the ocean of being. In such a philosophy, he says, being and value, often separated in present philosophic thought, would be united.*

*Readers of the above article will be interested to learn that the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association invited Dr. Romero to be one of its speakers at the First Inter-American Conference of Philosophy to be held at Yale University December 28, 29, and 30, 1942. Dr. Romero submitted a paper to be read in his absence. The conference was cancelled because of transportation difficulties. An abstract of Dr. Romero's address on "Contemporary Tendencies in Hispano-American Thought" and an abstract also of Professor E. S. Brightman's paper on "Structure and Transcendence in the Thought of Francisco Romero" appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXXIX (Dec. 3, 1942), 682-684. (Editor's Note.)

The Future of America and the Unitarian Church

HUGH W. WESTON

There is nothing very mysterious about prophecy—except that most of our prophets have tried to make of it something very mysterious. Therefore, unless they guessed right, they were wrong. The art of foretelling the future is not that of reading the stars, nor that of reading the facts, but that of knowing whose and what facts to read, and that of interpreting them realistically and dialectically. Those who have done the latter have not been surprised by any of the major events of our time: the depression, the Munich deal, the Nazi-Soviet peace pact, the outbreak of the war, the German attack on Russia, or the Soviet resistance. Those who were surprised, unless unusually humble people, now spend their free moments debunking what they term the “clever guesses” of the less surprised.

What does it mean to speak of “interpreting the facts realistically and dialectically”? First and foremost, it means to recognize the *fact* of the class struggle. This does not mean that we have to approve of the class struggle, or recommend it. But we have to recognize it as a fact of the modern world. Seeing this, we also see that all information, all facts, are (partly) *class* facts, and *class* information. In other words, information is never *pure*, but it is always (partly) ideological. If we read no facts but those of the dominant class, we will not repeat truth but ideology (which of course contains truth, but a limited portion).

To interpret facts realistically, we must first learn to read more than the particular facts offered by a particular economic and cultural class. To interpret facts realistically, we must read them without being prejudiced by the class shibboleths inculcated into our minds during so many years.¹ Above all, we must confront the facts offered by spokesmen of all classes without preconceived ideas as to their validity. We Americans are especially addicted to the habit of approaching the study of a particular group with preconceived ideas

¹A little book, *Oh Yeah!* (New York: Viking Press, 1932), gives a striking illustration of how the nation's outstanding economists, bankers, and industrial leaders were completely wrong on their prophecies of an early recovery from the depression. For all the facts that these men knew, they did not understand economics as well as many steam fitters and coal miners.

about the "inherent goodness" of that group as compared with the "inherent wickedness" of some other group. "Inherent goodness" does not exist in any group nor "inherent badness," but both simultaneously in all groups, and the progressiveness or destructiveness of any group does not depend upon inheritances but upon class relationships, and more specifically, it depends upon the grace of God with reference to class relationships.

To interpret history dialectically, we must understand that all historical development is through contradictions and the overcoming of contradictions. This proposition, as ancient as Heraclitus, and set forth in brilliant form by Hegel and by Marx, explains so much that few serious students of history who have intensely studied it have rejected it. Most historians who reject dialectics are those who have never studied dialectics. When we understand dialectics we see that for any statement made about an historical situation, the opposite statement is also, in a sense, true. That is, the opposite is constantly *threatening* to be true. Every alliance contains within itself the contradiction to that alliance. Everything that develops contains its opposite, and in developing, it synthesizes with its opposite, and thus destroys its original nature. When we say, "The United Nations will win the war," we must bear all this in mind. True, the United Nations will win the war, but they will not be the very same kind of "United Nations" that helped begin it. And if it is true that the United Nations will win the war, it is also true that, in a certain sense, they will lose it. That is, they will lose many of the principal objectives, voiced or unvoiced, with which they entered the war.

Understanding the future of the world is vital to understanding the future of the Unitarian Church. At the present time, certain events of the future are already becoming very apparent, and it would be well if the Unitarian Church took cognizance of these trends, preparing itself for the gigantic swings of history which are just ahead.

Among these things are the following:

I

It is now becoming apparent that the governments of Britain and America and the classes that support them are moving to consolidate and unmask their imperialist motives in this war. This has been becoming increasingly apparent ever since December of 1942. Among the evidences of this are the following things: the decla-

rations by Churchill regarding the preservation of the French and British Empires, his statement that the war against Germany might not end until possibly 1944 or even 1945, and that the war against Japan may not end until some unforeseen time in the far-distant future, the Darlan affair and the ensuing British American entanglements, the size of the American and British armies and their disposition, and finally, the failure thus far in the war to open a second front. The cowering appeasement of the "beat Japan first" bloc by the Anglo-American governments is but a reflection of an impetus to extend the war and to direct it increasingly in terms of certain imperialist motives.

On the other hand, there is growing opposition to aspects of the war in Britain and America, and the dominant classes are seeking, with considerable success, to counteract this inevitable rise of opposition by proposing ever more glorious imperialistic ambitions, by exaggerating small local victories such as that of Tunis into victories of first magnitude, and by playing one section of the opposition off against the other.² At the same time, these classes seek to persuade the people to endure a long war and to sacrifice unstintingly for it.

American capitalism is striving to direct the war effort in such a way as to avoid two stark dangers: 1) any questioning of the role of capitalism and profits in the war, and 2) any serious conflict within American capitalism itself. The capitalists of the heavy industries, lacking the temerity of their German brothers, hesitate to dispense with their fellow capitalists of the consumers' goods industries in the interests of an all-out war effort. Instead they seek to place the entire blame for shortcomings upon the "complaints of the people" regarding rationing, upon strikes, upon absenteeism, upon anything but themselves. At the same time they depend upon the Soviet Union to hold their imperialist enemy, Germany, in check, thus eliminating the necessity for an all-out war effort that might involve either the necessity to close down the consumers' goods industries (those that are non-essential) or the necessity to further curtail war profits, or both.³ This is not to say that the capitalists bear all

²This is well illustrated in the case of the coal miners' strike where the propaganda of the press was directed so as to divert the feelings of the soldiers and mothers of soldiers against the coal miners rather than against any aspect of the war effort which might involve a questioning of war aims.

³George Soule, in an article, "The Profit Stays in War," *New Republic*, May 31, 1943, p. 722, has indicated some of the reasons why American capitalism is afraid of any questioning of its role in the war effort.

the responsibility, nor even most of it. The whole American people bears the responsibility for our failure to effect an all-out war effort. But capitalism creates the situation in which this responsibility arises.

The greatest single evidence of the aggravated importance of imperialist motives in the Anglo-American war effort is the failure to open a second front. It is not and never was impossible to open a second front, excepting as imperialistic motives in the war created the conditions of that "impossibility." It would be possible beginning tomorrow to stop the manufacture of luxuries and non-essential goods, to curtail advertising, close tens of thousands of non-essential retail stores, and to utilize the manpower and material thereby saved for the building of those cargo planes, escort vessels, etc. needed for the development of a second front. All this was done long ago in Germany, Russia, and China, or those nations never could have fought as long as they have. The failure of Great Britain, after being at war more than three and a half years, to do more than arm and maintain a few small token forces in Africa and India—and this only with bounteous help from outside—surpasses even the failure of the United States. The ruling classes in America and Britain pose in their press the false question: To which theatre of war should our war material go? rather than posing the correct question: What is responsible for our failure to produce enough for *all* the theatres of war? In addition, they find ways of confusing the people in order to excuse the system they wish to defend. In addition to arousing the ire of the soldiers against the strikers, arousing the ire of workers against those guilty of absenteeism, etc., they even lay the blame upon the "complaints of the American people." The failure to launch an effective all-out war effort in the cause of freedom is not due to the complaints of the American people. The complaints of the American people are rather due to the failure to launch an effective all-out war effort clearly based on the issue of democracy and freedom. The two, however, complement and aggravate one another in creating the existing situation.

The complaints of the American people regarding food rationing are not to be laughingly dismissed as another American "gripe." Coming at this time, they clearly mark and symbolize the failure of the American political and industrial leadership to provide any clear conception of what the war is about. To visualize the tragic reality of this thing, one only needs to visit a country like Mexico

and compare the Mexican slogans and posters on the war with our own. In Mexico, under the leadership of the government and the trade unions, the real issues of the war are made burningly clear to the most simple Indian peasant. One Mexican poster condemns fascist intimidation in education. Another stresses racial brotherhood. A window display portrays the collective farm movement of the Russian peasants. The American politico-industrial leadership is afraid of the implantation of such ideas. And so our advertisements and posters urge us to fight so that pretty girls will admire us, so that our flag shall still fly, because the Japanese race is inferior (by imputation), etc. The complaints of the American people are a reflection of the fear and failure of the American political and industrial leadership (with a few brave exceptions), to urge the people to fight an anti-fascist war. It is only on this basis that we can explain the success of the Nye-Wheeler-Hearst-Gerald Smith clique in restoring unto itself a prominent and dangerous position from which vantage point these isolationists are able to snipe at the war effort through their attacks on the second front. This success on the part of these so-called "isolationists" depends directly upon the persistency and aggravation of imperialist motives in the war, on the one hand, and upon the consequent complaints of the American people on the other.

All of this means that, trying to hold together a dozen contradicting tendencies to stave off the inevitable necessity of outright repression, the political and industrial leadership of America and Britain is being forced to prolong the war as long as possible—in terms of its imperialist motives. All sections of this capitalist leadership are united on the program of prolonging the war. Even the former appeasers wish to prolong and drag out the war, though some wish its emphasis shifted to counter Japanese imperialism rather than Germany's, because they are fearful of an early Soviet victory. All of this means that, despite any promises to the contrary, American troops will not be fully demobilized for many years to come. And it means that American troops in Africa, or in any part of the European war theatre, must be seen in a double and dialectical light—as constituting a great hope for the defeat of fascism, and yet as containing a potential danger, for they may readily be used by imperialist-minded leaders to suppress waves of "radicalism" which will sweep the Balkan area and Italy shortly after the defeat of

Germany.

As if in anticipation of these coming waves of radicalism, an anti-radicalism and anti-labor trend has manifested itself in the American press, and this trend will continue to sharpen. At the present it is directed against certain "labor leadership" and profits by the fact that here and there a few unscrupulous racketeers have utilized the labor movement for private gain. But soon this mask will be dropped, and where previously only trade union leaders were attacked, all free union activity will be under fire.

II

In spite of any efforts to prolong the war, it is now clear that the Soviet Union will defeat Germany much sooner than expected, possibly by the beginning of 1944. The war effort by the American and British nations, in spite of what has been said heretofore, is not being conducted on 100% pure imperialist motives. In so far as there are other motives, there will continue to be a genuine effort on the part of many American and British people to win the war quickly. Not only that. It is not true that it is fully to the advantage of every facet of Anglo-American imperialism to prolong the war indefinitely. A multitude of reasons can be given to explain this. For one thing, prolongation of the war might delay maximum Anglo-American production until a time too late for effective dealing with anti-imperialist movements in Europe and South America. Thus, to a considerable extent, in spite of a general effort to prolong the war, Anglo-American imperialism, in conjunction with the liberty-loving peoples of Britain and America, will help Soviet Russia in defeating Germany. The immediate presence of Red armies will enable communism to arise in many disaffected areas. Russian policy will become violently internationalistic, and will take a sharp anti-imperialist, anti-American, anti-British, and pro-German turn, based on the struggle against fascism, and for the winning of German labor to the cause of socialism. The dissolution of the Communist International is a tactic of political strategy, and nothing more.⁴ Those who unwisely give the dissolution of the Communist International more significance than it deserves, will find themselves at a loss to explain the post-war stand of Soviet Russia which will be based upon economic and military exigencies. The Red army will

⁴If there is doubt about this, the reader should study the writings of Stalin and others on dialectics. According to Stalin, "Dialectics is the soul of Marxism." (Joseph Stalin, *Leninism*, [New York: International Publishers, 1942], p. 116.)

attempt the ruthless extermination of the entire Nazi party and machinery, and will attempt to shoot Goering, Goebbels, Hitler, Bock, and the other leaders, even as Russia is now insisting that Hess be shot. This will not be so much from desire of vengeance as from desire to create the conditions for a socialist revolution in Germany. It is obvious that American and British leaders, however opposed to such a policy, will be powerless to stop it because of its great popular appeal. They will be unable even to offer asylum to Nazi refugees for this same reason, unless the latter are lesser known figures. But they will oppose this policy in other forms. They will fail to insist upon the extradition of the Nazis from countries like Spain and Argentina, to which they will flee. And they will protest against unilateral punishment of the Nazis, demand equal opportunity in "bringing the culprits to justice," and will warn us, in part correctly, but for false and insincere reasons, against the menace of "bolshevik imperialism's going too far."

At this same time, the contradictions between the interests of the British Empire and of America, so clearly revealed in the Darlan affair, will become bitterly acute, thus hampering their ability to cope with the radicalism of Europe and to effectively prosecute the war against Japan. But the prosecution of the war against Japan will of necessity continue, even though British help may be qualified, and though Chinese help may be drastically curtailed owing to the anti-American stand that the communist wing of the Chinese Republic will take.

III

All this means that the peace conference following this war will blow up. The United States will play with the Vatican and right-ists to prepare counter-revolution, while Russia will prepare revolution, and while China will be divided. This failure of the peace conference (which may take the form of its failure even to take place) is the most important single thing to understand in the history of the future. It is important not to dismiss this idea because we do not like it, but to see that this outcome is sad but almost inevitable, and to prepare for it, and resolve to make the best of it. This failure of the war to fulfill the illustrious dreams of the world Utopia held out to the people by the big corporations, means the greatest disillusionment in the history of America and of the world. The people of America will be given a jolt from which they will not immedi-

ately recover. With the blowing up of the peace conference (or the failure to apply its program, which amounts to the same thing) will come the most important moment in the modern history of the Unitarian church. Only if we prepare our people for this and lead them in this situation will we retain their respect and their ear.

IV

Following this war, many areas of Europe will eventually enter upon eras of recovery and reconstruction. But England and America will sooner or later be caught in a financial morass, serving as an ironic sequel to the disillusionment attendant upon the failure of the imperialist-conceived world Utopia to materialize. England is much closer to solving her problems than we are. No country in the world is closer potentially to a post-war fascism than the United States of America. This is due to the above-described dilemma on the part of "heavy" and "light" industrial capital, to the division in the ranks of labor, and to the unbroken and unbridled nature of the American press, plus an utterly unrealistic program on the part of communist and other anti-fascist leaders. Only the free church can save this situation, unless some unforeseen changes occur in present anti-fascist leadership. To suggest that anything so much in disrepute as the church can save the situation is very brazen indeed. But within the free church there is the possibility of developing both organized power and a correct strategy. But first the pessimism, cynicism, and defeatism that infest it must be overcome.

To suppose, as do many communists, that American capitalism will immediately fall into a never-ending depression as soon as the peace conference is over, is as dangerous as it is untrue. American doctrinaire capitalism is far from dead, and by that fact it constitutes the greatest threat of post-war fascism in America. After an initial depression following the war, which hot-heads will term the death-knell of American capitalism, a certain period of recovery is to be expected. This will be based on the conversion of defense industries into those producing consumers' goods. (Not all will be converted, of course.) But this very attempt at conversion will give the credit structure just the extra puff of air in the balloon that will burst it. Once the surplus income of the corporations ceases to be paid out in wages to those producing the new capital goods, and begins to be paid out in dividends, interest, insurance, advertising, etc., the

whole thing will crack, and the most crucial moment in American history will be at hand. It is the moment of the second American Revolution, not to be expected until many years after the close of this war.

Out of the Second American Revolution will come either fascism, a continuation of a previously established fascism together with a new war against communist Eurasia, or socialism. Of course, if socialism should ever be established in America (and there is no guarantee that it ever will be), socialism itself will give rise only to new forms through which the old evils of idolatry and abuse of power will, in new ways, manifest themselves.

Every moment of Unitarian Church history must be oriented increasingly to the history of the future. A church preaching rational optimism and reform through relief and education will obviously be an anachronism in a period such as that described. A church preaching sentimental humanitarianism when hate and bloodshed are all about will serve only to aggravate the hate and the bloodshed. Such a church will die.

Were it not for one factor, the outlook for the Unitarian Church would be hopelessly black. That factor is its congregational freedom. The free church contains within itself the power to adapt itself to the new situation. This is not true of the un-free church. The greatest threat and yet the greatest opportunity of all time confronts the free church today. If the free church can preach compassion and mercy as well as science and education, humility and long-suffering before God as well as progress and human dignity, and social struggle rather than the achievement of individual perfection, then the free church will be able to make a tremendous contribution in this great historic opportunity. To do so it must either abolish or re-interpret such dangerous clichés as "salvation by character" and "progress of mankind onward and upward forever." And it must protest against the whole capitalist-individualist philosophy which these shibboleths defend. The free church must see that emotion is more important and more powerful in history than is reason (though the two can never be properly separated), and that symbolism and liturgy are more adequate means than the syllogism for expressing religious truth in our era. The free church must recognize the fact of social sin and social responsibility, and preach social salvation through religious conversion. In this, it must

adhere to the historic fundamentals of liberalism—racial brotherhood, more equitable economic opportunity, peace, democracy, and freedom. The entire order of service must be a pledge to serve God through serving democracy, and this pledge must be expressed not only in terms of Biblical times, but in terms of the personal and social problems of the day. The entire symbolism and liturgy of the free church, and even its architecture, must not only be extended but revised so as to point meaningfully to the new situation. In this, there are two contemporary institutions more than all others from which free church liberals must learn—the Communist Party and the Roman Catholic Church.

The outline that has here been made of the future of America is conservatively stated. One could make a year-by-year time-table of these events, but it would be guess-work and not prophecy. It has been impossible in this outline to explain in great detail all of the interpretations that lead to the conclusions. But many people will already have come to similar conclusions, perhaps more accurately formulated than are these.

We do not here deal with the question: Would we like it if history were this way? We deal with the question: History is going to be this way, so what is the Unitarian Church going to do about it? History, from the standpoint of the individual, or of a particular institution, is, to a greater or less degree, irresistible. It contains much that is, from this standpoint, inevitable. Thus, though we are free, we are not as particular individuals or institutions free to stop the course of history and radically to re-direct it. Not we, but God, is the Ruler and Lord of history, and only in so far as He lives in us and gives us freedom can we even change history. But we can live in history by living in God, and we can make our lives meaningful by the historic decisions that we make. This, of course, is a viewpoint suggested by the theologian, Paul Tillich.

The American people are the most idealistic people on earth—that is, not altruistic, but lacking in realism. Therefore they are utterly unprepared for the shocks that lie ahead. They are still dreaming of cottages in the country and white Christmases, and they will be until the ground caves in around them. The Unitarian Church is on the threshold of a great decision—for or against history, to go forward, or to stand still and let history pass it by. If Unitarians are still like their forefathers, they will decide *for* history, and not against it.

The New Unitarianism

HAROLD P. MARLEY

Unitarians have recently been informed that a new statement of Unitarian principles is being prepared. Ministers have been invited to participate in the preparation of the document which is prompted mainly by the present world crisis. With positive assurance that this is no creed, it is assumed that unless a church has something definite to say about the world situation today, it has little right to a place in this world situation, for better or for worse.

Those who are skeptical of this new codification of Unitarian experience, probably see the difficulties in getting general agreement on anything but generalities. They have sat in conventions enough to know how effective is the tooth-extracting ability of liberal brethren when once a definite resolution on some controversial issue is introduced. Not even the famous five articles of James Freeman Clarke were officially adopted, and at the Annual meeting in 1870 the Hepworth motion for the preparation of "an authoritative statement of the Unitarian position" was voted down. In 1921 the Laymen's League labored and brought forth a statement of six short sentences, which Charles Francis Potter said was the best statement Unitarians had ever had. "It is," he wrote, "positive, definite, constructive, comprehensive. . . ." Three of the six points were theistic, and Dr. Potter later became the founder of the First Humanist Society.

Everyone would welcome taking the old tools out of the Unitarian chest and giving them a good sharpening, but if we are merely to slip a new blueprint into the top of the chest and lower the lid, then it would seem futile. Everyone wants to meet the new world challenge, but it cannot be intelligently grappled with unless we proceed on a functional and realistic basis, rather than on a rhetorical one. No statement of principles is valid which is based on vague ethical ambitions rather than on actual experience.

If Unitarians will recall their destiny, it began on the very practical field of *integrating* a trinitarian idea which was generally held and almost universally believed. Unitarians didn't deny God; they merely integrated Him. They held that out of the old theological experience there could come a new experience which would make the

God idea acceptable to thinking men. In doing this, they rendered great service. When it is lightly said today, "There are Unitarians in all the churches," it is forgotten that these neophytes would not be there if it had not been for the forthright and courageous acts of a few people a long time ago.

Now, when the Unitarians are seeking some way to deal with the present world crisis, they may take a page from this experience of the fathers. They can ask, "What is there in the world today which needs integration?" "Where has the intellectual aspect of life lagged behind the generally accepted beliefs of today?" We should today raise the question, "If the old Trinity issue is gone, what is the new trinity?" There is a trinity of experience in the present which just as sadly lacks integration, and which is therefore acting as an obstacle to human progress. It is not specifically in the field of religion—at least not in the traditional sense, but since it is basic to human belief and conduct, it is not beyond the legitimate interest of religion.

Actually, this non-theological trinity in human experience might very well serve as a place for Unitarians to focus their attention and then evolve a new *program* of action. This trinity springs from three life imperatives, and is functional, not doctrinal. Fundamentally, it deals with the daily routine, and is therefore intensely practical. It completely undercuts the variety of issues which plunge men into endless arguments. Whoever and wherever the person is:

He must live

He must live with others

He must live with himself.

Here is the epitome of economics, of sociology and of psychology as they are applied to the individual in his round-the-clock motivations. Yet, important as these things are, each to the other, they are not integrated. A person wants to *live*—every cell of his body cries out to exist, and yet, because men have failed to live together there are wars and strife in which men must *die*. Supposing there was no conflict and all men lived as brothers, there would be many who could not live with themselves. They would be torn by psychoses and would live in fear of their own shadows. Therefore, these three life imperatives must be integrated so that they will not work at cross purposes—father against son, and son against holy ghost.

If we say that this trinity of imperatives is a sound functional

approach to modern problems, we can also say that their integration and the understanding of each part is a valid undertaking for any group of people who find themselves in a liberal church and who are looking for some group activity. Just as each liberal man and woman can see these three imperatives in his own life experience, so the liberal church can already see many ways in which it has been trying to integrate these things in modern living. The new Unitarianism is already here in essence—we have only to set it up boldly before us as a worthy objective. We need only say:

- 1) Living means survival in the economic struggle for existence. It means getting and holding a job such as each considers adequate to his powers of creativity.
- 2) Mere existence is not enough, for there is a social competition of living with others. Modern society is so interdependent and people are so influenced by what others think, that nearly every choice involves social elements.
- 3) Furthermore, to live with others involves the question of what is a valid individualism in a collectivist order of society. Otherwise, psychological problems arise which cut across the imperative of living and living with others which may completely upset the balance, causing the person to do silly and wasteful things.

All three of these things taken together mean the *good life* and the *new social order* about which we have been prating. There is no short cut to these objectives—we must pay the price of personal and social adjustment and bring unity out of a three-way proposition.

The new Unitarianism which essays the role of integration manifestly cannot be a revival of the thinking of a hundred years ago, but must be a rational approach to the problem in hand, the same as the original Unitarian movement thought through the complicated issues of that era. Now, as then, three aspects of the same thing must be taken and bound together into a single unified harmonious belief. This is no cavalier gesture in mathematics, but is a profound computation growing out of a basic understanding of the integral parts. The combination of these three drives within the person and the acceptance of the social consequences, implies a re-evaluation of the environment that has tended to unbalance this person and caused him to be disillusioned and deficient in some aspect of his life.

Notice, for instance, the offhand tendency of some individuals and some nations to say "Man Must Live," without submitting their economic determinism to the discipline of the new Unitarianism which insists that man must live well. There is the extravert who has specialized in the imperative that "Man must live with others," allowing his own self-organization to be gummed up from inattention. Or, consider the introvert who spends all his waking moments in day dreams, in a rendezvous with things that never happen. No, the fractional emphasis upon life is just as confusing as it was upon the concept of God. Each may be a least common denominator to help in the understanding of people, but they are not ends in themselves—the life quotient is more profound and sublime.

Economic adjustment comes first, not because it is the most important, but because it heads the procession of maladjustments. It is but one pillar in the temple of man and if allowed to stand alone it is only a cenotaph pointing to the animal ingredients of human nature. As a pillar, it has badly sagged and caused serious dislocations which it is in the business of every thinking person to concern himself about. The new Unitarianism must help people to accept the new kind of economic order which will come out of the war. This is not easy when it is considered that many a person's economic understanding goes no further than his own pocketbook, his wrangles with the plumber or his knowledge of stock market quotations. Nevertheless, by digging deep, it can be shown that every person is by nature industrious and willing to bear his share of the burden.

The first step in the new trinity implies the second—men must live together in a non-exploitive arrangement. The old competitive struggle between people will henceforth become the friendly rivalry of running the race, not a conquest to possess the stadium. Therefore, the work that man does in order to live will do more than provide every person (not a beggarly two out of three) with proper food, shelter and clothing, for it will call out something within the person which adds to his joy of living. It will be a creative act because men will know that they are adding to the store of happiness of the race. This is the key to living with others—work with them toward some worthy end, not because of legalistic push but from voluntary urge. How different, if working hours and conditions of labor were left to those engaged in the industry. If everyone worked,

the assignment would be quickly fulfilled, and if all worked together as a common project, the hazards of production would be as readily recognized and corrected as a fire in the schoolhouse. Picture a community that coordinates agriculture and industry—a place small enough so that everyone knows his neighbor and large enough so that he doesn't know him too well. Such an arrangement would not only bring the new trinity to earth but would strike at the very basis of discord and make strife as unthinkable as treason. Taking a page from the past—electrifying the grandfather clock, man can effect a better living when he is close to the soil and the machine; he can live with others more harmoniously when he knows and is known; he can live with himself only when he believes in himself and in what he is doing.

Living with self is largely a reflection of the life we live. A person who has security and friends is not likely to bolster his ego by artificial pampering. Let a person once feel himself to be a necessary part of the functional principle of life as here enunciated, and then the psychiatrists can take down their shingles. Add to the mine-run of adjustments that each person must make for mental hygiene's sake the host of other adjustments to be made after this war, and we have some idea of what is facing the average man. Some, feeling themselves superior because of race or position, will rebel at a functional ordering of society. They are to be pitied for they are psychologically unprepared for the new day. Others will be miserable because of the scars inflicted by the prodigality of war. Then there will be the many who are confused and will make a mask of the old Trinity to hide their own lack of social understanding.

What, then, will help these people who lag behind in some particular, and what will be the integrating factor in social change? Probably, as in similar situations in the past, there will be a new interest in religion. In a community where people are living happily in harmony with neighbors and surroundings there may be no need of a church, but if this ideal life is ever to come it will arrive because the church, along with other institutions, has upheld a valid program of the new Unitarianism. Truth, however simple, is not on leash, being led docilely through the park; it is a wild horse that holds the bit in its teeth. What idea, however brilliant, ever became common property until it was given a warp and woof, a foundation and a roof? Some group with a background as glorious in the human

tradition as religion, and with a passion for the unattained, is the only guarantee that there will be a next step for the new trinity. Here and there we shall see a church that will assume the unpopular role of proclaiming change from the housetops. Keeping in mind the least common denominator of society, the person, it will function through:

A sanctuary, for the mood of reverence

Discussion groups and forums, for instruction

An ethical critique of, and influence in, the social order.

By keeping a balance between reason and emotion, and between each little world of interest and everybody's world, a true cosmic planetism can be effected. If a person is not only inspired, but is also given an outlet for his particular interest; if he is not only brought to self-understanding but is taught his brother's language, humanity will march forward without stopping to argue the relative merits of religion and science.

The question might be raised as to whether liberals in religion are able to make this stupendous contribution to modern living. There is a popular claim that the church has obstructed progress. Critics have looked from the dungeon of Galileo at the solar-centric sun for so long that they are blinded to the many instances when religion has upheld science—even fathered it, as in the case of the Austrian monk, Mendel. They overlook the times when men of science have themselves impeded progress, not from religious scruples, but because of professional jealousy or the simple thralldom of the habitual. Actually, religion both conserves the past and takes risks with the future. The church stands as the one institution in human society which dares to question the status quo and which operates on the basis of democracy rather than *laissez faire*. Instances of medieval carry-over of the feudal church in modern life, as in Spain, are rare. Usually, the church either keeps up with the procession, or as in Russia and Mexico, is jerked into line by political edict. Fundamentalist Protestantism, in a non-priestly way, comes dangerously close to repeating the mistakes of those who start with the assumption, "The Church must live," for these personal salvationists always think in terms of an authoritarian plan of survival.

It is the free church, freely accepting the tenets of science and having a conscience in the matter of putting these tenets and the persons they can influence, together, where the greatest hope lies.

The free church is not to be confused with any existing denomination, but is to be regarded as having those prophetic tendencies that are to be found to some extent in all churches. If the new Unitarianism adopts a functional approach to living through a basic understanding of economics, sociology and psychology, then it can again be said, "There are Unitarians in all the churches." To be a liberal in theology is important, but it is not final. If one believes in God, it must be a God who has inspired and continues to inspire men to find the truths in these three fields. If one does not avail himself of this mystic comradeship, he can nevertheless develop an expanding interest in man and in that shrinking speck of the universe which is man's home. Prayer will shade into mental hygiene and worship into aesthetics. This does not jeopardize the institution of religion, for it is becoming clear that men cannot free-lance their way into the land of truth or hitch-hike into Utopia.

This is to say that if the new Unitarianism is to become effective today it must have the framework of an institution, just as the older Unitarianism was pyramided on the foundation of certain Trinitarian churches. This institution will borrow from the past, but its spirit will be definitely that of today, with its eyes on the morrow. It will not assume an air of sanctity but will acquire its sacredness from the points where it touches life most intimately. It will need no missionaries, for all men know from experience what is the complete life and what is not. Its symbol, the triangle, will remind men of the delta of the great waterways of the continents, and of the configurations of the stars which ever beckon men out of themselves. It is an equilateral triangle, for no man dare assume more of life for himself than for his neighbor, or hold that he can live by bread alone. No pillar in the temple of man can arrogate unto itself an extra cubit.

The new Unitarianism is as inclusive as life itself, bound simply together. Not even the dread divisions of a war can alter the underlying assumption that all men live by these three basic imperatives—and die in the hope of their fulfilment. We move forward today over graves strewn thick as flowers among the grasses. Yet, they all seem to be stepping stones to new and better living. The time will come when we will look upon our neighbor and say:

He lives, because he is productive

He lives with others, because he is cooperative

He lives with himself, because he is creative.

Unitarianism in Early Kentucky

AUGUSTUS P. RECCORD

American Unitarianism had its origin in the liberalizing tendencies which characterized the closing years of the eighteenth century and the opening years of the nineteenth. To these tendencies Kentucky was not immune. Until 1792 it was a district of Virginia. Then it became a separate state. The early settlers came largely from Virginia and the religious atmosphere of the state, especially of its political and social leaders, was distinctly liberal. The Constitution of 1792 declared that "all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences," and this statement was reaffirmed in the Constitution of 1799. For a time it seemed as though religious liberalism might become the dominant characteristic of the state. It was suppressed, however, by the growing opposition of the evangelical churches, led by the Presbyterians, who declared that Calvinism was the only Christian religion, and that any departure from it was a form of infidelity. Outstanding among these infidels were Dr. Joseph Buchanan, whose *Philosophy of Human Nature* was an attempt to find a scientific and philosophical basis for religious liberalism, and Augustine Eastin, a Baptist minister, who was expelled from the Baptist Ministers' Association because of his Unitarian views.

The chief conflict was with regard to the control of the publicly owned Transylvania Seminary, later Transylvania University, at Lexington. It was precipitated in 1794 by the election of Harry Toulmin, an avowed liberal, as president. This aroused the opposition of the Presbyterians and, with the support of the Methodists and Baptists, they secured legislation which led to Toulmin's resignation and the transfer of the control of the University to the conservative members of the Board of Trustees. In 1801 the University declared that no sectarian influence would be brought to bear upon the student body. Five years later it declared that "to guard against skepticism, the leading Christian doctrines," meaning those acceptable to the Presbyterians, "would be inculcated by precept and example." One could hardly imagine a more complete surrender.

The struggle, however, was not over. It flared up again with the election to the presidency of Horace Holley. Holley was a

native of Connecticut and a graduate of Yale College and Divinity School. He was liberal in his religious views and after a few years as minister in a little Connecticut village, he became minister of the Hollis Street Church in Boston. There he identified himself with the liberal wing of Congregationalism and soon became recognized as one of "the most eloquent pastors that had graced a Boston pulpit." Obviously such a man would not be acceptable to Kentucky Presbyterians. Holley was first elected in 1815, but the vote was rescinded later, not, it was alleged, because of any criticism of his conduct or character, but "because it was reported that he had adopted sentiments which did not exactly quadrate with Calvinism." The liberals, however, were in control of the legislature, and a legislative committee condemned the decision as "sectarian and undemocratic." In 1817 Holley was again elected to the presidential office. The Presbyterians, however, had one more arrow in their quiver. They wrote to a Charlestown minister, Rev. Jedidiah Morse, a bitter opponent of Unitarianism, and asked him to secure the insertion, in the newspapers which Holley was accustomed to read, of the statement that he was elected by a bare majority of the Board of Trustees, that the majority of the citizens were opposed to his election, and that if he accepted he would find the community arrayed almost solidly against him. Nevertheless Holley accepted and under his leadership the University grew in numbers and in influence.

For a time the opposition was silenced. Later it was aroused by the very success of Holley's effort. According to one authority, "the Presbyterians employed every conceivable device to achieve the destruction of his administration. They preached against 'the infidel' in the presidency. They made efforts, through conversations on the streets, to get the people to oppose him. They took advantage of the hospitality of his home to spy out facts which they could use as charges against him." He was accused of being an enemy of the Bible, of denying the doctrines of the Trinity, the Deity of Christ and the Atonement, of not having family prayers in his home, and of defending the theatre, card-playing and dancing. Through his influence, it was alleged, the university was being conducted in the interest of a minority sect. Strangely one of his bitterest opponents, a former president of the university, established a paper, *The Christian Register*, to counteract Holley's influence.

Through it all Holley maintained a discreet silence. His friends,

however, among them many professors and students, rallied to his defense. When, however, the Governor of the State lined up with the opposition, he abandoned the struggle and in November, 1827, after nine turbulent years, he severed his connection with the institution. This marked the defeat of religious liberalism in Kentucky. As a consequence, as one author expresses it, "Kentucky became increasingly an orthodox Christian state" according to the Presbyterian model. This incident in the history of religious liberalism in America leads one to ask, what would have been the result if Holley and his friends had won? Might it not be that American Unitarianism would have stemmed from Kentucky, rather than Massachusetts and that Lexington, not Boston, would now be our Unitarian Mecca?

Note. Since the above was written *The Filson Club History Quarterly* (Louisville, Ky.) has published an article describing a later crisis in the affairs of Transylvania University. After President Holley's resignation its condition had grown steadily worse. In February, 1834, the university found itself again without a president. Henry Clay, although no longer a trustee, was deeply interested, and was determined to have a president who would carry on the liberal policies inaugurated by President Holley. His choice was Francis Lieber, a young German refugee, who later became known as one of America's outstanding political philosophers. Clay urged Lieber to apply for the position and promised his support. In this he was aided by James Freeman Clarke, minister of the Unitarian Church in Louisville. Lieber delayed action, hoping to be sent upon a European mission by Girard College, and when at last he applied, it was too late. The trustees had already filled the position. Thus ended a second attempt to liberalize the university.

Time-Thinking and the Logic of Space

H. LESTER MONDALE

Thanks particularly to Henri Bergson and E. G. Spaulding (with his correlations of critical logical material in his *New Rationalism*), much has already been done towards the end of a revaluation of logical methods. Bergson still remains to be reckoned with in his critique of the knowledge erected on traditional thought forms. Intellectual knowledge, as he insisted, is *external* and not intimate, is *relative* to the interests of the thinker, is *abstract* and *partial* and not representative of the whole truth of anything, is *static* and therefore dead, is *analytical* and therefore not representative of the synthesized organism. Had Bergson championed and offered a less mystical substitute logic his criticisms would undoubtedly carry more weight, as will presently be indicated. E. G. Spaulding's non-subjective and frankly objective critique opens a new vista to logical thought in his characterization of traditional logic as "thing logic." Accordingly he traces the major fallacies in all non-neo-realistic metaphysical thinking back to the logic of "things with a core in which qualities inhere." In his revolt against the resultant conventional cause-behind-the-cause thinking he builds a system and a universe of things and subsistents, an "additive pluralism," which, as will be noted presently, reflects not the promising vistas of his new logical insights, but rather the limitations of the old.

In Spaulding's suggestion that our logic has been "thing-ized" lurks the further and possibly more adequate suggestion that the logic of things is essentially the logic of space and space relationships. This is borne out not only by the close relationships of the thought-forms of Euclidian geometry to Aristotelian logic but also by the shape of the conventional logical forms themselves. Syllogistic thinking is primarily a matter of the relationship of the forms of inclusion and exclusion; and the idea of inclusion and exclusion is almost necessarily expressed in terms of spacial enclosures. If A is included in B and if C is included in B then C must necessarily be included in A. Moreover, the rules—two things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, the principle of identity; the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts—are highly suggestive of things in their space relationships.

That Aristotelian logic is space logic, as is implicit in Spaulding's suggestion of "thing logic," stands out in more brilliant perspective when viewed in the light of Count Korzybski's almost forgotten work on space and time. Therein is the suggestion that thinking in terms of space relationships, the capacity for "space-binding," is not limited to man alone but is also shared with the animal. Thus space-thinking has a grounding in race history which makes it almost the instinctive mode of conceiving of reality in all its aspects.

According to Korzybski, man, almost alone among the animals, has the additional capacity of "time-binding." He can think in terms of an historic and geological past and of an apocalyptic or business-analyst future. Thus time-thinking, as Korzybski indicates, comes comparatively late in the evolution of life. Hence, we may add, the extreme difficulty we experience when we come to conceive of time and think in terms of time. In the time process, a process of which we have become consciously and acutely aware only within historic times, we find a mystery that we do not find in space relationships. Space relationships are so commonplace that we find little wonderment in them except in rare moments on mountain tops or at the conclusion of a lecture on astronomy. Time, however, and the time-processes ordinarily suggest the mysterious and the miraculous. It has been in the time process rather than in space that civilized man has been most likely to find his God. So dimly do we apprehend the time process that speculation invariably clothes it with the weird trappings and trimmings of eschatological imaginings.

Time-thinking, moreover, runs into a frustrating and confusing element that contributes not a little to the reputed mystery of the time process. This frustrating element, which is seemingly apart from the frustrations of our inability to sense either the beginnings or endings of time, is due in large measure to the fact that our time-thinking is carried on largely in terms of the concepts of space-thinking. We have just mentioned the frustration of conceiving of a beginning and of an end to time—is this not thinking of time in terms of the usual experience of space relationships as having beginnings and endings? When we come to think of time it is almost invariably in terms of space-thought. The hour glass is time in terms of a changing volume of sand; the clock is time in terms of the space a hand moves over a dial; the pulse is time in terms of the increase or decrease of the volume of blood in an artery; the hours

of the day, in terms of the position of the sun or the stars. So habitually do we think of time in terms of space-thought that a little attention given to analyzing the conventional concepts of time quickly reduces it to an illusory status . . . or at most to a mere category of the mind.

The world we live in, however, is through and through a world of sequence and of events. Time conceived in Einsteinian terms is of energy and space, and is not to be thought of in space-terms of the front and back ends and the middle of something but in terms of a phase of reality which is interchangeable with space and energy . . . as a dimension of reality. Time is time only in terms of space and energy, in terms of a whole in which space is space only in terms of energy and time, and energy is energy only in terms of time and space. Here then is a further suggestion of the necessity of more adequate logical forms of thought if thinking is to be representative of or coherent with the real and the actual.

The problem before us is clarified somewhat if we consider space-thinking in its historic perspective. Do this and the anatomy of the cause-behind-the cause thinking which so distresses Spaulding, becomes apparent. Paleolithic and neolithic men already thinking in terms of space and finding themselves in a world of sequence and event were confronted continuously with events like the sudden appearance of game or fish, and their very livelihood depended upon their skill in tracing the sequences behind the appearance of this potential food. Where did the deer come from? Where were his haunts? Where did the fish come from? Where were his feeding shallows? So, also, with the appearance of the stranger and enemy, the storm and its antecedents, the baby, disease. Behind the seasonal sequence of greenery and its disappearance, the seed; and with the grasping of the seed-sequence, the birth of agriculture; and then with agriculture, radically new folkways and a revolution in mores.

Obviously, practical mastery of the world could come only with a growing awareness of sequence in reality. And for most immediate and practical purposes the thinking of sequence in terms of the logic of space was adequate. Thinking of the time-aspects of reality in terms of the logic of space might be most fruitful, might eventuate in vast scientific knowledge of sequences and of sequences behind sequences seemingly linked in casual relationships; therefore, of causes and of causes behind the causes. Thinking of this stripe might be

productive of wondrous scientific, philosophical and theological explanations of man and of history and of the nature of the world. Actually, of course, space-thought gave rise to no end of would-be approximations, and frequently near-approximations to truth, often parading as truth final and complete. But herein also lurked the uncontrolled and the controlled lie hitherto suggested. (JOURNAL OF LIBERAL RELIGION, WINTER 1943.)

The flaw in the thinking that would go to the cause-behind-the-cause and thus plumb the depths of reality and give us the true picture of man and his world was ably pointed out by Spaulding in his suggestion that "thing-ized logic" is inherently incapable of dealing with the time sequence, which requires a logic all its own. This logic, he believes, is that of science, particularly if science is viewed from the vantage point of the theories of emergent evolution. From this viewpoint the space-logic that the thing is equal to the sum of all its parts does not hold for the emergent, which is not only the sum of its parts but always something more. Herein again is a most fruitful suggestion, but one which Spaulding, in failing to realize its implications, failed, as will be indicated presently, to incorporate into his Neo-Realism. The implication of the idea that the premise of space-logic (that the thing should be equal to the sum of all its parts) does not hold for the thing as a part of a sequence (that is, in a time series), suggests the fallacy not only of most everyday thinking but of most supposedly scientific thinking. The fallacy lies in this, that since we tend to think spacially of an object according to the laws of excluded middle and inclusion and exclusion, etc., and that since when we come to think in terms of time we tend to think of the sequences that lie behind the appearance of the object in time, we also tend to pick out one antecedent interval in the sequence, and (by the unconsciously habitual application of the laws of the logic of space) to think of the object in that one particular antecedent interval as the real. In other words, we tend to think of the object in one particular antecedent interval as the real because the spacial logic of identity and of the whole being the sum of all its parts will not permit us to think of it as being somehow in the causal sequence and at the same time in the present observed object, and at the same time again as being in the future object. This fallacy shows up cancerously even in Spaulding's Neo-Realism, which for all its antagonisms to the cause-behind-the-cause with its inhering-reality sys-

tems, and for all its reduction of the world to things and subsistences, finds in the world the proximate cause of knowledge and consciousness and the explanation of consciousness as subsistent relations, and finally finds in the most inclusive or universal subsistent the cause and end of all creation, God. How completely the foregoing fallacies are illustrated in Spaulding's system as well as in the antecedents to an era of uncontrolled and controlled lying stands out clearly only when seen against the background of an elaboration of the kind of logic the time process apparently calls for.

How habitually the average man thinks of the sequential aspects of reality in terms of its forms is illustrated by the almost invariable answer to the question: "What is water?" The unfailing response is, " H_2O ." Water, the water of the lake and of the drinking glass is regarded as in itself something of an illusion. In terms of space-thought it cannot be both itself and something else; and since in terms of its sequential appearance it is at one interval of its existence hydrogen and oxygen, and since this interval has been more forcibly thrust upon most persons' minds, therefore what the water is at this particular antecedent interval is what it must be in reality at any other interval of a sequence. A more adequate idea of the nature of water is contributed by the theory of emergent evolution. Water, according to this viewpoint, is not just the two gasses, the molecules of which are grouped in such wise as to produce an illusory watery appearance, it is the gasses *plus*. And the plus is the emergent, a real entity with characteristics that it is impossible to infer from no end of studies into the nature of hydrogen as hydrogen and of oxygen as oxygen. This position is doubtlessly a closer approximation to reality than that which sophomorically imposes the logical categories of space upon the object in an arbitrarily chosen interval of the time sequence. But it leaves unanswered the most important question as to what is the logic that befits the time sequence?

The question brings us back to the answer given to the query about the nature of water. Water is, as the emergent evolutionist would have it, something more than H_2O , but water *is* also H_2O . The concept of water which would conform to its reality in the sequence must include both the ordinary, everyday experimental water-concept and the concept of hydrogen combined with oxygen in proportions of two to one. The more adequate concept then is the bridging concept, and the logic of bridging might be termed *transconceptual*.

Transconceptual thinking can be illustrated again by thinking of water in terms of sequences of water as such. Water is the substance of the lake in which one swims, of the fluid one drinks; but water cooled to a temperature below 32 degrees Fahrenheit is ice or snow, and water heated to a temperature above 212 degrees Fahrenheit is steam. If water were regarded merely in terms of space-logic, it would not be water as such, or steam or ice or snow. These would be merely the illusory appearances of the water molecule in the different space relationships and groupings relative to temperature and atmospheric pressure. This explanation, however, leaves, among various questions unanswered, the question as to just how it is that the molecular groupings are so fixed at different temperatures—why the sharp division between water and ice, between water and steam? Here then are forms which must be included with the concept of molecules to give us the concept of water. Granted the forms, then, one must also grant the separate existence of *emergent* appearances and their characteristics. Thus if water is thought of merely in terms of its molecular constitution it can be adequately conceived, even so, only in terms of transconceptual logic—water in each of its molecules as being water but also potential with the characteristics of ice and steam; ice as ice in each of its molecules but also potentially as water and steam. Hence an idea of the reality of water in its potential time sequences can be stated only in transconceptual terms as water-ice-steam . . . or, to be even more in keeping with the demands of transconceptual thinking, as H_2O -water-ice-steam. (And if the *forms* that determine molecular combination be entered here, then to the H_2O -water-ice-steam would have to be added subsistent forms.) Transconceptual logic thus recognizes what space-thinking cannot conceive of, that the object in any antecedent interval of the time sequence is not identical with itself at the moment and that it is to be thought of only in terms of a bridging concept that conceives of the object in terms of all conceivable intervals, past, present and future, of the time sequence.

Immediately the question, prompted by the habit forms of space-logic, arises: How then can there be anything like true knowledge? According to space-logic there can be no true knowledge (if reality is regarded transconceptually) of anything without the knower's first having transcended all human limitations and traversed the length and breadth of space and time. It would seem that the objects we

perceive in experience, if we thought of them transconceptually, would have a significance similar to that of a camera without films or a phonograph record without its phonograph to a present day New Guinea highlander. Actually, although the logic of sequence cannot yield knowledge of the inclusion and exclusion type of accuracy expected of space relationships (an expectation that makes the lie of the truth), it does yield a knowledge that is a much closer approximation to reality . . . and particularly to the realities of human nature, of social problems, and of man's relationships to the cosmos. Transconceptual thought occupies in its application to these broader and wider aspects of living what, roughly speaking, the Einsteinian geometry occupies in speculation on the broader and wider and deeper aspects of the physical universe.

Transconceptual thinking has occupied a far larger place in the development of our knowledge than is apparent at first blush. A stone, for instance, becomes a stone in the transconceptual sense (not just a percept) when it has taken its place in experience alongside objects of wood and sand and mud. Then it stands out in its hardness, its heaviness, its durability. This, insofar as it goes, is true knowledge, an accurate approximation to reality. The stone, moreover, is more completely known as the concepts connected with it multiply in experience and we come to think of the stone's reality in terms of a further bridging of the concepts; in terms, for instance, of crystallization or fossilization, chemical constituency, etc. At this stage the knowledge that the stone as such must be thought of transconceptually, is in all probability the biggest and most important factor in our knowledge of that object. Conceived transconceptually no one sequential aspect of the stone is taken as the whole, the reality. Thus in limiting the claims of any one shadowy sequential aspect to represent the whole, transconceptual thought prevents the aspect's pretensions to "the truth" that experience is so likely eventually to label as the lie. It is the transconceptual, "thus far and no farther at present," which keeps one closest to accurate representation and most nicely within a system of coherence.

If one were to speak of *transconceptual reality* he would not be dealing with a mere abstraction, but rather with the true nature of the object as it would be seen and understood by one capable of seeing or conceiving it in its various possible forms, its history and future, its relations to other objects, etc., and not under a separative

and arbitrarily selected interval in one of its potential sequences. This method of thinking, although we have been far from fully aware of it, has been the essential characteristic of the movement of much of the thought that has been contributory to the development and the sustaining of civilization. Water, for all its identification with H_2O , has ceased to be the naive concept it was before the onset of electrolysis; the same with salt which is still salt but also something more—fine white grains in the shaker, and $NaCl$. The very idea that salt is more than mere white grains conduces to a transconceptual attitude which raises our wonderment and our esteem of reality as such. So it has been with the concept of the earth. No one has ever seen the earth as an astronomical body. Individuals have seen its round shadow cast on the moon, its curvature in the stratosphere photograph, but the earth for most persons is no longer merely the expanse of plain and mountain and sea, over-arched by the heavens of Genesis. It is plain and mountain and sea, and also a globe floating in space, born of the sun, going somewhere, becoming something—an astronomical body.

To indicate how transconceptual thinking yields knowledge that is a closer approximation to the realities of human nature, of social problems and of man's relationship to the cosmos, we must return to the point at which spacial thought fails in its juncture with the time sequence. It will be recalled that the flaw, basic in our attempts to approximate reality in thought, is the arbitrary selection of the conditions of a particular antecedent interval in a time sequence and the regarding of the conditions of the particular interval as reflecting the true nature of the object in time. The reason for the arbitrary selection of a particular antecedent interval and for regarding its characteristics as definitive of the object's nature harks back to the limitations of the forms of space-thinking. According to these latter thought-forms the object cannot both be what it is in the present and also what it was at some antecedent interval; if it were it would violate the basic postulates of space-logic. Thus if water is H_2O , the water we know in the present must be in some sense unreal and illusory, and the real, the grouping and combination-forms of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Thus again according to the same space-thinking, if the water molecule can also be steam then the steam and the water and the ice appearances are but illusory and unreal appearances of the real which is the grouping and combination-forms of water molecules. Obviously, thinking in terms of space-thought

imposed upon the sequential aspects of reality cannot give an accurate approximation to reality. The real in time is not to be approximated by thought which limits the object merely to one interval in a sequence which must include the object as it has been, as it is, and as it is yet to be (or may be).

The object in time can be approximated only by a bridging of the concepts attaching to intervals of its past, its present and its future . . . and in defiance of the limitations of space-thought. Thus the object in time can be approximated only in terms of thinking that is transconceptual. The object viewed transconceptually is in its present form not merely an illusory appearance of its characteristics in some arbitrarily selected antecedent interval, nor is it merely an illusory appearance of its characteristics in some arbitrarily selected future interval. Neither are the characteristics of any past nor any future interval merely illusory reflections of the object as it exists in the present moment. The object is at once, in a sense outrageous to the categories of space-thought, more than can possibly be revealed by a study confined to its existence in any one interval in time . . . it is more than itself at any one interval. It can be approximated only by a bridging of the concepts of all graspable intervals.

The world and man, transconceptually viewed, become radically different from the strange approximations given us by way of the strangely distorting prisms of space-thought. Our world and man within it have been all but irrefutably reduced by cause-behind-the-cause thinking (with the characteristics of some arbitrarily selected sequential interval regarded as the only real) to several levels of reality of materiality and immateriality, of beastiality and divinity, immorality and saintliness. Because of the limitations of our habitual thought-forms world and man are generally regarded with fanatical faith as either material-mechanical-bestial, or immaterial-free-angelic, or phenomenalist-pragmatic-hedonistic. The thought of the world and man as material springs largely from the arbitrarily selected antecedent interval regarded as the real; the world and man as essentially immaterial, from the arbitrarily selected "far-off divine event" future interval; and the two as phenomenalist, from the arbitrarily selected present.

The world taken transconceptually, however, is not a world of intervals on one level. Water, again, is not merely the fluid in the drinking glass, not merely the molecule potential with the forms of water, steam, ice, not merely the hydrogen and oxygen atoms. We

approximate in time to the reality only when water becomes a reality which is inclusive of the concepts associated with water as such, with molecular combinations, with atomic combinations. But we cannot stop here. In the thought of the reality of which the concept of the fluid in the drinking glass is but a phase, we must also include the electronic energy base of the atom as well as the organic living substance of which water is such a large and integral part. Water then, the fluid of the drinking glass, gives us but a few of the characteristics of an interval of something more which, viewed transconceptually, partakes not only of the qualities of the water of the drinking glass but also of the qualities of the electronic energy base and of organic living matter. Thus water, transconceptually viewed, is more than itself; it also partakes in senses of which we are but dimly aware in our present state of scientific development, of the electronic energy band of the reality spectrum as well as of the organic and living bands.

The achievement of knowledge of the real in time, achievement of transconceptual knowledge that is, is a dual process. First, with the grasping of each new conceptual aspect of an object, in an antecedent, present, or future interval, another area of the transconceptual realm comes into the scope of conception. Thus knowledge is increased and expanded. But it is also extended by virtue of a second aspect of transconceptual thinking. With each newly described aspect of an object, or with each newly disclosed relationship to other objects, the object itself stands forth in a new light. It is seen as something more than the object it was thought to have been; it partakes more fully of the transconceptual in that it partakes of a wider portion of the reality spectrum, which, in turn, is reflected in the object. Thus in coming into the knowledge of any object in time we find it on the one hand coming more clearly into our ken, and on the other hand partaking more fully of reality which is transconceptual in the sense of being over, above and beyond present conception. The object transconceptually conceived is seen as partaking of the beyond in the object, of that in the object which is more than its present seeming identity. The transconceptual, hence, is a term descriptive of reality as being in a sense transcendent (to present knowledge) and yet as unfolding (into knowledge) and becoming conceptual. Thus both in the conception of the characteristics of the object in any new interval and in the recognition of its transconceptual qualities we approximate to true knowledge of the object.

Reality looked at transconceptually is first and foremost dynamic, a space-time-energy process. It exhibits a tendency to focus in individualistic sequences; its characteristic, to become inter-related in forms. The most arresting form of the individual object in time is its present, and it is to the form in the present that life must direct the greater portion of its practical and reflective energies. Because the present form also partakes of its past as well as of its future the way is left open for man to discount the present and to conceive of reality more in keeping with momentary desire and comfort, as an illusory reflection of the characteristics of a romantic past interval or of a coming future utopian interval. The present form may be as stable as the biological form of the shrimp or the Atlantic seaboard kelp or medieval agriculturally based Feudalism, or it may be as unstable as the sandhopper of Lake Bikal or the present prevailing economic-political set-up, but in either case the present form is of first importance in any successful adjustment of man to reality. Even if the form is patently unstable it cannot be cavalierly discounted, for always lurking within and without, and imperceptible, are the elements that have made the present characteristics dominant and that ordinarily have larger powers of persistence than are easily recognizable. Thus to the dynamic and the orderly qualities of reality transconceptually viewed must be added the indeterminacy contingent upon the tendency to variation and unfoldment. The object, then, in the time process, standing forth as more than itself at any one interval, partaking in an indefinable sense of the qualities of all other intervals of its being in time, points to a far more wonderful, mysterious, and perhaps sublime all-enfolding reality unfolding through all, than we have hitherto felt free to contemplate.

Materialistic theory looked at from a transconceptual viewpoint loses all relevancy. It roots in the aforementioned fallacy of space-thinking, the arbitrary selection of the characteristics of an antecedent interval of the object in time and the assumption that since these characteristics represent the object as identical with itself, they are therefore its reality. Atomic theories materialized reality only on the basis of the arbitrary assumption that the characteristics of the smallest divisible particle of any object was the object. Transconceptually viewed, however, even a scientific reaffirmation of the most extreme and mechanical Democritean atomism, and a *mechanical* reduction of Heisenberg's principles of indeterminacy could no longer materialize and mechanize reality. The atom, taken transconceptually, would

partake of the molecule and its qualities, also of the organic living substance and its qualities. It would have to be conceived in terms of transconceptual wholes which, although partaking of the atom and of mechanical behavior, are not reducible to a mere atomism or mechanism. Transconceptual logic requires that the mechanical atom (always supposing that it is mechanical and Democritean) take its place along with other elements and with their qualitative divergencies, with the compounds and their qualitative divergencies and emergents. The atom itself, for all its seeming (in terms of space-thought) function as the building block and monad of the universe, becomes in turn transconceptual. Manifestly what holds for a Democritean atomism holds also for the electro-dynamic theories. Electro-dynamic theories taken transconceptually offer neither more nor less in the way of saving reality from materialistic and mechanistic conceptions. The electron partakes of the organic and the organic partakes of the electron, and both reflect wholes that can be approached only transconceptually. Idealism, like materialism, rests upon the same basic space-thought patterns according to which reality must be understood in terms of the characteristics of some antecedent element or essence. In terms of the logic of transconceptualism the idea must take its place alongside the atom or the electron. The atom and electron thus cease to be identical with themselves, and so with the idea; related, each becomes a partaker of wholes that again can be approached only transconceptually.

Reality viewed transconceptually calls for not a few marked revisions of theistic thinking at all points in the time-process where contact is made with a Being which is supposedly unconditioned and beyond the time-process. An unconditioned Transcendent is subject, at all points of contact, to the same peril of theoretical irrelevancy we have noted in the case of materialism, energism, and idealism. A Creator taken in the sense of a posited spiritual source of reality, would have to take His place transconceptually with the objects of creation and their behavior—and the result would contribute little if anything to the present transconceptual approximations in which the organic and consciousness and thought are included. Transconceptually viewed, reality does not need spirit characteristics, as arbitrarily selected end-intervals in the time process, to save it from the taint of materialism. Spirit or self at either end or both ends accomplishes no more than spirit at any interval. And the very fact that arbitrarily selected spirit at the supposedly culmination-end interval

cannot hold as the essential and real in transconceptual thinking, and rather that an interval redolent with the characteristics of spirit, at either end, is not necessarily the end and culmination in either case, suggests that spirit itself must be taken as sharing in a transconceptual whole in which flesh as well as spirit partake, and in terms of which both must be conceived if either conception is to approximate reality. Space-thought conceives of time in terms of ends, a beginning end and a closing end, and to save reality from the indignity of the low-level characteristics of reality in an antecedent interval, and taken as identical with itself, a spiritual Creator must necessarily be posited; thus are man and the world process given dignity and direction. Transconceptual thought, however, conceives of time as time (without beginning and without end) and of the object in time as being at no interval identical with itself. The universe becomes thus, markedly Brahma-istic, without, of course, being necessarily cyclic.

If space-thought (for all its labored extensions in science) has failed to give us an adequate approximation to the nature of the world it has doubly failed to give us an adequate approximation to the nature and destiny of man. Here again, we find the same squeezing of reality into levels, the same arbitrary and degrading selection of man's characteristics in an antecedent, or determinedly present, or vaultingly futuristic interval of the time process and the naive assumption that the man of that interval is identical with himself, and the man of other intervals is illusory. Because man at one interval in the time process was an animal, therefore in terms of space-thought, identical with himself, he remains merely the animal at all successive intervals. Because, to arbitrarily select another interval, he was a congeries of chemicals coagulated into mechanically interacting organs, and because he must then have been identical with himself, he remains merely the chemical-mechanical phenomenon. Because, to arbitrarily select another interval, he is supposed some day to become the angel, and because at that moment he will be identical with himself, he exists today merely as the unawakened, or the unpurged angel. Because at one interval in his individual history he was the child, and therefore supposedly identical with himself, he remains the child of conditioning and traumatic experiences.

The implications of transconceptual thinking unfold into infinitude. What they are in regard to human nature, in theology, in the realms of sociology and economics and ethics remains to be found by the explorer.

A NEW VENTURE IN THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION: TRAINING FOR POST-WAR REHABILITATION

GEORGE H. WILLIAMS

Unitarians on the West Coast, through the Starr King School for the Ministry in Berkeley, are participating in a project of post-war rehabilitation already receiving national recognition. Three theological seminaries in Berkeley, among them our own Starr King School (formerly the Pacific Unitarian), have pooled their resources for the establishment of an institute for training men and women for religious and cultural reconstruction in the Orient and in Europe after the wars. This venture into a new kind of theological training may well mark a new phase in the development of social work and missions. Designed primarily for college graduates who at the present seek to enter the larger ministry of emergency service, the curriculum is, nevertheless, flexible enough to meet the needs of theological graduates, social workers, returned missionaries, and devoted laymen irrespective of previous training. Although the precise kind of service needed will be known only as the smoke of battle clears from a given area, these theological schools are convinced that the churches and other sending agencies must press forward even though they must improvise as they progress. Confident that a religious program of reconstruction will appeal to a wide range of men and women, the Schools will open their doors for instruction September 6. Registration may be made at Pacific School of Religion, the Church Divinity School of the Pacific and the Starr King School. Particulars and a sample curriculum may be obtained on request from any of these institutions.

Unitarians will be glad to know of the important part played by Dr. Frank Munk in the initial deliberations. Dr. Munk, prominent member of our Church in Berkeley, professor of economics at the University of California, was saved from occupied Czechoslovakia through the efforts of the Unitarian Service Committee. An ecumenical churchman, continuously in contact with the suppressed elements in Europe, Dr. Munk has impressed the organizers of the post-war training with the ruthless and systematic liquidation of leadership in church, state, and culture, especially in Eastern Europe. He has convinced the representatives of the three schools of the need of preparing hundreds of men to go into the devastated areas to bind up, heal, restore, and recreate both institutions and men. Keenly aware, however, of the danger of either a shallow Americanization or a restoration of reactionary elements, Dr. Munk has exhorted the planners of the projected rehabilitation instruction not to fall into either error. The hope of all is that we may send abroad an army of men and women of spiritual discernment impelled with the energy of righteousness who, having paid their tribute of compassion, will move into the stricken areas setting free the captives of hate and restoring sight to the blind.

Book Reviews

FOR FREE MINDS

Rethinking the aims of religious liberalism can at no time be more important than today when a great change in religious thinking is obviously being brought about by so many factors. Professor Bixler correctly sees that religion will not survive the impact of these factors except by marching on the path of a forthright liberalism and activism.¹ "If we have any sense for what religion means," we gladly read, "we cannot sit idly by and do nothing to apply it to a social order in which stocks rise as wages are reduced." Bixler pointedly adds that "the church has suffered from a bourgeois point of view." Two aspects of the religious outlook which have been neglected under the impact of an easy optimistic faith, according to the author, are dualism and process. But Bixler himself has not abandoned this optimistic faith nor the desire for one. He rather emphasizes it in saying that we must worship God as goodness or we cannot worship him at all. But surely we can do this only as long as we consider our worship in the form of long-accustomed patterns of thought. Bixler is particularly interested in dualism (of good and evil, of body and mind) which should be used by religious liberals as a protest against the materialistic denial of spirit and the empiricist denial of reason current in certain circles, and as an approach to God both by way of the body and of the mind.

In chapters six to ten, he builds a sort of substructure in a round-about way in order to form a conception of liberal religion from the synthetic picture that emerges out of the philosophies of William James, Santayana, Dewey and Royce, and to gain a vantage point for his attacks. He is mostly stirred by the new orthodoxy, which appears to him as a new irrationalism based mainly on the assertion that the responsibility for all events, even for life's frustrations, is to be handed over to God. These authoritarians, be they Moslems or Barthians or, not to forget, Fascists, are willing to trust all to the unconditioned will of God. Yet, however strongly Bixler emphasizes the fundamental enmity between irrationalism and liberalism, he cannot help conceding to the non-rational mental attitude the most important contributions to religion, yes, even to the roots of religion. For instance, it is "non-scientific ways" that must be used for discovering the meaning of the universal process of growth. No doubt, the case for liberalism has changed appreciably since political liberalism is being attacked in a different way from that of the older attacks against religious liberalism. Barthian theology, the chief target of Bixler's arrows, suppresses religious liberalism just as dictatorships suppress political liberalism, and

¹RELIGION FOR FREE MINDS. By Julius Seelye Bixler. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1939. 247 pp. \$2.50. This volume was originally assigned for review to Dr. L. J. van Holk, Professor at the University of Leyden and Secretary of the International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom (Utrecht). Due to war conditions, however, Dr. van Holk has been unable to communicate with us; hence, the delay in the publication of a review of this significant volume.

Bixler is of the opinion that the power of reason is strong enough to destroy all opponents of liberalism.

Bixler, in his ardor for surprising statements, makes the distinction: Christianity exalts love as the supreme ideal, liberalism defines its ideal as the truth that not only makes us free but also serves as a corrective to private prejudice. We should like a clear definition of the author's attitude toward both Christianity and the rational method. Bixler clearly sees that the recently rising irrationalism in theology is a reaction due to the fact that some theologians "have not seen that knowledge of God differs in kind from other knowledge," a proposition that is in accord with the author's admission that God is not simply "a value." On encountering such a statement, however, we recall Bixler's assertion that liberalism is "an illustration of the rational method in religion," and therefore we are constrained to ask in what sense religious liberalism is "the free acceptance of rational beliefs and a tolerant effort to bring out the universal elements in experience."

Here is a book that presents a vigorous discussion of many a serious problem of religious liberalism in our day.

The Meadville Theological School

CARL BETH.

A REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

In appraising this volume¹ it is necessary to keep in mind that it grew out of lectures on philosophy of religion, and that it reflects a concern over precisely those issues and questions which are of primary interest to American college students. It is intended as a college text-book, and as such it represents a distinct distribution. It covers the material in a comprehensive manner, and there is behind it a liberal philosophy which will be stimulating to students; the author makes no attempt to conceal his own views, but he never assumes the role of dogmatist. As a text for a course in philosophy of religion, it may be rated very highly.

However, to those of us who are familiar with recent contributions to the field, who have no pressing need of a text-book, Professor Garnett's work is somewhat less significant. It is too comprehensive to permit deep probing of vital questions; the defense of his own position against alternative schools of thought is frequently somewhat unsatisfactory. There is sometimes something more to be said for another view than is taken into account, and many issues are passed over before they are adequately stated. It is unfair to pass such general criticism, but one example may suffice to illustrate the point.

Anyone acquainted with the current spread of New-Orthodoxy must admit that it is making deep inroads into traditional theological thinking; many erstwhile liberals, humanists, and non-conformists have been deeply shaken by this new movement, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to go forward without at least squaring off with what is being taught. But Prof.

¹A REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By A. Campbell Garnett. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1943. \$3.00.

Garnett takes little thought of this stirring of the theological waters, and one is surprised to note the names which are not so much as mentioned in the "Index"—Niebuhr is mentioned only once, in a footnote, as having written two "moderate and stimulating" books touching on the difficulty of the naturalistic view. Really, the old problems are not quite what they were before Niebuhr and others began writing—one need not have sympathy for the new orthodoxy to admit that . . . and it may not suffice to dismiss the Barthian movement as an expression of a "postwar pessimism in Germany [which] crossed the seas with the rising tide of post-Versailles disillusionment and created an impression upon minds distressed by scenes of economic injustice and disorder." And, Prof. Garnett concludes, "the effect appears to be no more than to cause a wholesome re-examination of features of religion which the liberal theologians had been neglecting." On the contrary, it would appear, the new orthodoxy is challenging the very foundations the liberal had thought most secure!

Basic to the study is the thesis that there is an element of conflict within the moral life, between the "egoistic" and "altruistic" tendencies in our nature. The latter is a tendency which aims at an objective result selected because it is a good-for-some-other persons, the former is identified with the choice of objective seen as good-for-me. That there is such a conflict none will deny, but to say that one or the other is basic to raw human nature is quite another thing. Traditional schools of thought have divided over this issue, but Dewey, Mead, and many others have pointed out the difficulties encountered in making raw human nature either egoistic or altruistic. Prof. Garnett should have developed his thinking on this point a bit more clearly. In his references to Marx, particularly with reference to his view of human nature, the same limitations are seen which usually follow from over-dependence on secondary sources. But most of the objections one may offer to the book find their origin in the fact that a text-book can hardly be comprehensive and at the same time penetrating. The author has written a first-rate college text, and that is all he would care to claim for it.

The Epilogue, "The Christian Faith," twenty pages in length, is an exceptionally suggestive statement, and it is our loss that the concepts suggested here were not expanded into a statement several times that length. Of special note, also, is the discussion of the relation of art to religion.

The First Unitarian Society,
Salt Lake City, Utah

J. RAYMOND COPE.

A NEGLECTED ANNIVERSARY

The 400th anniversary of the first authorized English Bible passed almost unnoticed in a warring world. Professor Willoughby's atonement for this neglect is a clear, brief account of some interesting features of the first seven editions of the Great Bible.¹ In this attractive brochure he gives a resumé of the history of English translations of the Bible; describes the tribulations of the publishers and printers of the

¹THE FIRST AUTHORIZED ENGLISH BIBLE AND THE CRANMER PREFACE. By Harold R. Willoughby. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. 49 pp. \$1.00.

Great Bible, as well as those of Myles Coverdale, its editor; evaluates the workmanship and influence of the Regnault typography; interprets the title-page woodcut, falsely attributed to Hans Holbein, the younger; provides the text of Archbishop Cranmer's preface to the second edition and then adds facsimiles of both the title-page and the preface.

Of especial interest is the interpretation of the title-page woodcut. Sixteenth century English society is there depicted on a single page as, under the benign eye of God Himself, His Gracious Majesty, Henry VIII, gives copies of the Word of God to Archbishop Cranmer and Thomas Cromwell, who in turn pass them to priests and lesser nobility, from whom again they are handed down to the lowly people. In one corner is realistically depicted the threat of prison for those who are not pleased with the generous giver or his gift.

The Meadville Theological School

MARGARET BOELL

WHITEHEAD'S IDEA OF GOD

This book gives an admirably clear, simple, and mostly accurate exposition of Whitehead's system, as basis for a criticism of his view of God.¹ The contention is that Whitehead's doctrine, though not wholly without religious values, yet lacks some of the essential features of a religious view of God. Unfortunately, the argument depends, at critical points, upon introducing assumptions which are as little religious as they are Whiteheadian. Thus the dictum that God could not "merge [at best an ambiguous term here] me and my values into an indefinitely larger system and still claim that I have maintained my individuality and my values" is a dogmatic denial of one of Whitehead's basic tenets—the conception of individuals as "prehended" by and so contained in other individuals—and this denial is not derived from any principle of religion. Again, Whitehead's saying that occasions are "intermediate steps" to the fulfilment of the divine being is taken to assert that God views them as mere "instrumentalities," not valued for their own sake, although Whitehead repeatedly explains that it is precisely our own intrinsic value of self-fulfilment that becomes part of the divine self-fulfilment, so that there is merely a rhetorical difference between saying that God values us for our own sakes and that he values us for his sake, his interest is inclusive of our interest. In Whitehead's terms, we are "means" to God only because we are "ends" which as such form part of his end. At every major point the contradictions which Professor Ely sees between Whitehead and religion are rather between one or both of these and Professor Ely's own beliefs (or misconstructions). Yet the author's mistakes, if they are such, are I feel honest, and there is a good deal of excellent analysis in this little study.

The University of Chicago

CHARLES HARTSHORNE.

¹THE RELIGIOUS AVAILABILITY OF WHITEHEAD'S GOD: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS. By Stephen Lee Ely. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942. 58 pp. \$1.25.

CHRISTIAN HUMANISM AND MUCH BESIDES

Professor John U. Nef of the University of Chicago probably would wince to hear himself called a man of wisdom, for plainly he knows, with more learning than most of us possess, that the wise men of history have been few. But in this book¹ there are a thousand echoes of the classic wisdom without which communications between human beings become a senseless noise rather than a way of understanding one another, and civilization, in spite of our vast material expansions, becomes a dangerous sham. Let nobody be misled by the title of the book, large and important enough though it is. The substance of the book is far greater than any consideration of the special responsibility falling upon the United States for the coming era. Professor Nef is concerned with the whole human situation, and handling an unrelenting argument like a sword, which occasionally he uses with flicks of ironic wit, he runs through every field of human interest and endeavour. How any man, presumably not yet elderly, has been able to devote himself to teaching economics in an American college and at the same time to preserve such sensibility to art and poetry, not to mention religion, is to me a matter of happy stupefaction.

For more than half a century we have been employing improved means to impoverished ends; indeed, the means have blinded us to the true ends of living; and the simple but terrifying fact now is that our civilization has lost balance. I think this is one of Professor Nef's key-passages:—"There is a great realm in which the intelligent mind finds it necessary to move, where the principles of conduct and of understanding cannot be determined by scientific experiments and objective tests. In this realm the only weapon is man's reason—his intuition and his powers of logical construction, as these are cultivated in the most intelligent beings by a long process of training and constant exercise, a continuous communion with the experiences of life and science, and also with those experiences as they have been distilled for us by the great minds of the past. . . . When the balance is overweighted, as it is today, on the side of natural science and the empirical methods of investigation derived from it, the freedom of the mind is no less threatened than when the balance is overweighted on the side of past authority, as it was at the end of the Middle Ages."

I suppose most of the readers of this JOURNAL are ministers. This book offers us a most exciting reinforcement of a Humanism which "is the antithesis not of theism or of Christianity, but of materialism."

The First Parish in
Milton, Massachusetts

VIVIAN T. POMEROY

¹THE UNITED STATES AND CIVILIZATION. By John U. Nef. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. 421 pp. \$3.00.